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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
PUBLIC UTILITIES-VALUATION OF LEAsEHLDs.-Appellant gas
company, a public utility, has a total of 814,910 acres of gas
territory under effective control, principally by lease. Of this
amount 136,384 acres are proven territory. 126,208 acres are
probable territory, the rest being designated as improbable or un-
favorable. Not all the proven territory is now in use. On the
"present value" rate base theory the appellant claims that its
leaseholds should be valued at $36,449,176.00 instead of the
amount fixed by the commission, $6,732,920.00, the "book value."
Held, "expert" testimony, based upon assumed quantities of gas
umder lease, but not yet in possession, estimated life of the fields,
estimated profits in an estimated and yet to be established "un-
regulated" market, is not sufficiently clear and positive evidence of
"present value" to justify* interference with the findings of the
)ommission. United Fuel Gas Company v. Railroad Commission
of Kentucky, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150 (1929), and United Fuel Gas
Company v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 49 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 157 (1929),
These decisions apparently terminate the long controversy begun
by the gas company in 1917 with the intention of doubling its rate
base by an ingenious appreciation of its leaseholds. 1 W. Va. P.
S. C. 504, P. U. R. 1918-C, p. 193; 1 W. Va. P. S. C. 561, P.
U. R. 1920-C, p. 583. The present decisions do not question the
"present value" theory of the rate base. The Supreme Court as-
sumed the soundness of the proposition that present reproduction
value of the property used-and useful in the business is to be taken
as the primary factor in determining the present value. Thus the
latest pronouncements of our highest tribunal still state the theory
which has given rise to such immense difficulties. See also, Mobile
Gas Company v. Patterson, 271 U. S. 131, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445
(1926). No attempt will be made herein to point out those dif-
ficulties. That has been done by many writers. See Richberg, "A
Permanent Basis for Rate Regulation," 31 YALE L. J. 263; Hale,
"The 'Physical Value' Fallacy," 32 YALE IL. J. 710; Hale,
"Pseudo-Protection of Property in Rate Cases," 24 MIcH. L. REV.
166. The accepted doctrine of valuation for rate purposes flows
from Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819 (1898). In-
creasingly muddied by every new decision, the turbulent flood be-
comes larger year by year. Justice Brandeis made an examination
of 363 cases taken from Public Utility Reports between the years
1920-1923 and found therein eleven distinguishable methods of
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arriving at the elusive "present value." Thirty-six of these cases
could not be classified, due to an apparent lack of any formula.
Missouri, ex rel. Telephone Companij v. Public Service Commission
of Missouri, 262 U. S. 276, 43 S. Ct. Rep. 544 (1923). However,
Goddard suggests that the commissions are more willing to ac-
cept an improved theory than the courts. "Public Utility Valu-
ations and Rates," 19 Micn. L. RTv. 849. Because we have no
certainty in this matter every possibility is tried by the utility to
the end that rates may be advanced. The public fights back man-
fully. The result is a compromise, usually without more than a
mere approximation to that which ought to be the base. ' Smyth v.
Ames, supra, allows almost everything "to be taken into consid-
eration" and in the end the result is in the sound (?) judgment
of commissions and courts.
Writers almost unanimously denounce the present value theory
as a logical fallacy, depending upon artificial and metaphysical
reasoning for its support. Every man of affairs knows that there
is no value except that based upon the return for service. To hide
the "bogey" behind the so-called rule of Smyth v. Ames is only
temporarily possible. The courts have refused to place the rule
squarely upon exchange value. Under such a theory the utility
makes its large earnings the excuse for a higher capitalized value,
that justifies an increase in rates, which in turn justifies another,
and so on, ad. infinitum. The converse would also be true. If the
utility earned nothing on one valuation, then the fault is in the
valuation, and to earn a return all that one need do is to make
up one's mind that the property is less valuable. The exposure is
too rapid-everyone perceives the "vicious circle." What avenue
of escape is there?
When one of the series of cases culminating in the decisions
here under discussion was before the West Virginia Supreme
Court, Judge Meredith expressed the regret of the court that it
was unable to follow the famous concurring dissent of Holmes and
Brandeis in Missouri, ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Com-
pany v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, supra, where
prudent investment theory was so ably championed for the rate
base. Judge 'Meredith said, "We think the adoption of this as a
general rule is to the ultimate interest of the utility, and parti-
cularly so to all those utilities that have made heavy outlays dur-
ing the past few years when prices were extraordinarily high;
and that as soon as new low price levels shall have been reached,
such utilities will themselves be clamoring for the adoption of the
very rule they now so vigorously assail." Charleston v. Public
Service Commission, 95 W. Va. 91, 107, 120 S. E. 398 (1923). It
is not to be seriously contended that the adoption of the prudent
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investment base for rates would be a panacea for all valuation ills.
No theory will be that. Its adoption becomes more necessary with
each passing day, in spite of its disadvantages. See, Goddard in
15 AfiCH. L. REv. 205, and also, Stanislaus Company v. San
Joaquin C. & L Company, 192 U. S. 201, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 241
(1904), which case Goddard regards as being the final rejection
by the court of this case. It has these positive advantages: It is
certain and ascertainable; it is largely free from opinion and
speculation; and, it is comparatively constant in the face of price
fluctuations. It involves the new concept-that one who has
invested for the public interest is entitled to a fair return upon
the value prudently invested, when invested, and to a return of
that value when the service is finished. It abandons the concept
that the property of the utility plus the increment, at the parti-
cular moment, is the property upon which a return is to be made.
What more could one ask, in the first instance, than the fair re-
turn upon the money invested? What, under the present theory,
will protect the utility when prices go down, as they may at any
time?
The difficulties of the present theory are well illustrated in the
two cases now before us. If it were not for the appellant's failure
of proof of the "present value" of gas under lease the people of
West Virginia would be paying nearly double the price which
they are now paying for their gas supply. Yet the District Court
found that the appellant was earning a fair return on about
$17,000,000.00 more property than the commission said they were
entitled to earn upon. Our own court has said that when the gas
company can establish the actual present value of the gas in the
ground by evidence independent of the rate of return or earnings,
and definite enough to be reliable, that it may include that value
in its rate base. Natural Gas Company of West Virginia v. Public
Service Commission, 95 W. Va. at p. 567, 121 S. E. 716 (1924).
In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court did not specifically
decide the point in the present cases, it is submitted that there are
two objections to allowing this supposed value to become a part of
the rate base: (1) Gas merely under lease is not "property" in
the rate-making sense. Hickenlooper, J. said, "Not only are per-
colating waters and oil and unrecovercd gas in the ground not
the subject of owneiship until recovered, but, if the subject of
ownership, such gas is the property of the owner of the fee until
recovered. Not only has such gas no value unrecovered in the
ground, but such value as it might have would seem to be the
property of the lessor." United Fuel Gas Company v. Railroad
Commission of Kentucky, 13 Fed. (2d) 510 (1925), citing therein
Headley v. Hoopengarner, 60 W. Va. 626, 55 S. E. 744 (1906).
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It is very clear that there is a substantial difference between gas
in untested fields and the tangible equipment of this company. It
would be decidedly unfair to the public to allow the utility to
hold immense tracts of acreage under lease at a value of some
$200.00 per acre, at a cost of not more than $5.00 per acre (delay
rentals being charged to operating expenses and paid annually by
the public) for by this means the utility could earn approximately
$28.00 per annum ($200.00 multiplied by the 14% return on the
base which was allowed). Further injustice could result if the
utility should abandon the leases after several years, when the public
would have paid in more than even their inflated value. (2) Aside
from the question of property, it is submitted that this is a mere
capitalization of earning power, which the court has refused to
sanction under any circumstances. The true limit of the "present
value" theory, even here, would seem to be the present value of
leaseholds in the market. Uncontradicted evidence in these cases
proved that the gas company had acquired leasehold rights during
1921 to 1923 at an average price of 83 cents per acre, and that in
1923, 15,184 acres were taken at a cost of 66 cents per acre. As
before stated, delay rentals were paid by the utility and charged
to operating cost. The whole investment amounted only to a few
dollars per acre-and the public was asked to double or treble
that amount annually in the form of rates on supposititious values,
payable into the company coffers.
-R. P. HoLLAwq.
CONTRACTS-ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANES-DAMAGES.-An in-
teresting subject, about which there is an apparent conflict among
the authorities, is that of alternative contracts, i.e., such as by
their nature may be executed by doing either of several acts, at
the election of the party from whom performance is due. Com-
pletion of one of the modes, at the option of the promisor, is a
performance of the entire contract. Where one of the modes of
performance is to pay a sum of money however, considerable
difficulty arises in determining whether it is still a true alternative
contract, or merely a contract providing for liquidated damages.
If the former, then by one rule the measure of damage for breach
of the contract is the value of the least onerous alternative, on the
supposition that had the promisor performed, he would have taken
upon himself the discharge of the alternative the most beneficial
to himself.1 Thus the promisee has only been damaged to that
1 WII=STON, CONTrAcTS (1920) §1407.
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